“That Churchill’s incompetence sent hundreds of thousands of British and ANZAC troops to a futile death in Turkey.”
The initial naval strategy to force the straits was sound; the failure lay in the hesitation of naval commanders and the subsequent land campaign.
“If there were any operations in the history of the world which, having been begun, it was worth while to carry through with the utmost vigour and fury, it was those of the Dardanelles.”
— Winston Churchill (House of Commons, 15 November 1915)
Gallipoli is routinely cited as Churchill’s greatest military failure. But the original concept—a naval forcing of the Dardanelles—was a strategically sound objective that was compromised in its execution by the ditherers and tremblers at the Admiralty.
In 1915, the Western Front was a bloody, static stalemate. Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, sought to break the deadlock by taking Constantinople, knocking Turkey out of the war, and opening a vital supply route to Russia. It was a strategy designed to bypass the trenches entirely.
Churchill’s plan was a purely naval operation. On 18 March, the Anglo-French fleet was on the verge of breaking through the straits. Turkish gun batteries were out of ammunition. However, after hitting uncharted mines, Admiral de Robeck called off the attack. Had they pressed on, the fleet would have reached Constantinople.
It was only after the Navy retreated that the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, ordered the disastrous land invasion at Gallipoli. Churchill did not command the army, nor did he direct the infantry assaults. He was made the primary political scapegoat for a campaign executed by others.